Abstract Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized ("hard-law") treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the "words-deeds" debate in international environmental policy-making.
Introduction
Many current environmental issues are of a transnational nature and cannot be addressed by states unilaterally or solely at the domestic level. Those environmental matters require 1 3 several nations' coordinated efforts at the international in the form of international agreements, i.e., formal treaties between two or more states for dealing with an environmental issue, which countries can commit to and participate in (e.g., Martin 1993 Martin , 2000 Fearon 1998; Leeds 1999; Schneider and Urpelainen 2013) . These agreements might pool resources, coordinate state policies, and thus provide cooperative gains for their members, although they impose costs as well on, e.g., countries' sovereignty.
A review of the literature highlights that states participate in international (environmental) agreements as long as the benefits stemming from accession outweigh the costs (Roberts et al. 2004; Bernauer et al. 2010; Wangler et al. 2013; Kelley and Pevehouse 2015; Pollack 2015) . Against this background, there are primarily three clusters of determinants that may influence countries' evaluation of costs and benefits associated with an agreement and, hence, their participation in international environmental treaties: 1 (1) treaty design characteristics, (2) domestic influences, and (3) systemic factors (e.g., Congleton 1992; Frank 1999; Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Neumayer 2002b; Murdoch et al. 2003; Beron et al. 2003; Roberts et al. 2004; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Fredriksson et al. 2007; Stein 2008; Bernauer et al. 2010; Perrin and Bernauer 2010; Lupu 2014; Pollack 2015) .
The following article focuses primarily on a combination of the first and the second cluster. That is, previous work has repeatedly shown that democracies are more likely than other regime types to cooperate via and commit to international environmental treaties (e.g., Mansfield et al. 2002; Neumayer 2002a; Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Lantis 2009; Bernauer et al. 2010 Spilker and Koubi 2016) . Theoretically, Mattes and Rodríguez (2014, p. 528) summarize that " [d] emocracies' superior track record [in international cooperation] is usually attributed to three institutional factors [...] : accountability of leaders, limited decision-making flexibility, and transparency." Specifically, it is argued that democracies are more likely than non-democratic regimes to provide public goods for their constituency; and since environmental quality is just a specific kind of public good, democracies are then also more inclined to cooperate in international problem-solving efforts as this may signal the willingness to ensure that good's provision (e.g., Congleton 1992; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Bernauer et al. 2010 ). In addition, citizens can express their preferences better in democracies and they benefit from a higher "flow of information." This should translate into more international cooperation over environmental problems as well, since citizens will demand this from their democratic governments (e.g., Congleton 1992; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Bernauer et al. 2010) . Bättig and Bernauer (2009, p. 285 ) focus on climate change and consequently conclude that "both the demand for, and supply of, climate mitigation measures are likely to be stronger in democracies." Furthermore, Neumayer (2002a, p. 139) stresses that "the spread of democracy around the world will lead to enhanced environmental commitment [i.e., treaty participation] worldwide."
Most importantly for our work, there is nearly universal consensus in the literature that democratic forms of government are strongly linked to the participation in international environmental problem-solving efforts. Clearly, however, not all democracies participate in
3
any agreement under all circumstances, for example the USA not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol or the Convention on Biological Diversity, Switzerland not participating in any of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea agreements, or Israel (despite signing it) refraining from ratifying the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. The following research takes this as a motivation as we address the question of how democratic members' participation in international environmental treaties is related to "hardlaw designs," i.e., environmental agreement legalization that is characterized by obligation, precision, and delegation (e.g., Gregory and Pollack 2010; Shaffer and Pollack 2011) . In general, states are more reluctant to participate in more legalized, i.e., hard-law agreements (e.g., Wagner 2001; Bernauer et al. 2010 Spilker and Koubi 2016) , while there is also evidence that hard law is less likely to diffuse within the network of environmental treaties (e.g., Böhmelt and Spilker 2016) . We contend that environmental agreements formed among a larger share of democracies are less likely to be characterized by hard law than soft law, i.e., democracies are less likely to participate in more legalized (hard-law) treaties. The underlying theoretical mechanism for this focuses on the likely costs stemming from agreement non-compliance that are imposed by international and, primarily, domestic audiences: democratic leaders may anticipate the costs of not complying with an environmental treaty. However, audience costs, especially domestic ones, are higher in democratic than non-democratic regimes, and it is anticipated that a hard-law design makes full treaty compliance more challenging. In combination, democracies will select themselves strategically into soft-law treaties, which allow maintaining flexibility and decision-making power, while the chances of treaty violation and, therefore, the risk of audience costs are lower.
The empirical analysis employs quantitative data by on global environmental agreements since 1950. Using a binary indicator for hard law as the dependent variable, we find that our core explanatory variable measuring the proportion of democracies participating in a treaty is negatively related to this item. The confidence in this result is further supported as we control for several alternative determinants of legalization and democracies' self-selection into an agreement (membership or participation), and by an extensive list of robustness checks that we discuss in the Appendix. Ultimately, this research makes three central contributions to the literature. First, we shed new light on the relationship between democracy and environmental treaty participation as well as design. Derived from this, secondly, our work potentially contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of environmental agreements. As Miles et al. (2001) show, there is a strong link between the design of an institution and its effectiveness. Finally, we contribute to the debate on "screening" (i.e., the selection into an international agreement) and "constraining" effects (i.e., whether a treaty actually can change state behavior and enforce compliance even if a state's (short-term) interests depart from the agreement requirements). The conclusion further discusses how this is connected to the "words-deeds" debate in global environmental policy-making (e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009 ).
Theoretical argument
Governments as official state representatives can participate in international environmental agreements and implement them at their national level, and they are those actors that can decide to leave a treaty. Hence, environmental treaty participation primarily involves the government of a state as the main actor (Wangler et al. 2013) .
2 However, a country's executive is also influenced by its domestic constituency (e.g., Putnam 1988 ) and, as Bernauer et al. (2010) , for example, show, governments care about their reputation in the international arena. We argue in the following that these international and domestic constituencies impose costs on a government in case of non-compliance with an environmental treatyand the design, i.e., the degree of legalization of an agreement, as well as the form of government of a focal country determine the substance of these audience costs. Ultimately, the empirical implication is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law due to a self-selection process into participation.
Starting with the design of an agreement, we focus on hard law and soft law (e.g., Gregory and Pollack 2010; Shaffer and Pollack 2011) . These concepts pertain to the underlying dimension of the degree of legalization, and they are defined according to obligation, precision, and delegation . Of course, there are potentially many different ways to design an institution and all of these features may perform different tasks. But their underlying latent dimension is about the degrees of commitment, bindingness, and constraint that are imposed on members. As a result, much of the previous literature (e.g., Goldstein and Martin 2000; Skjaerseth et al. 2006; Spilker and Koubi 2016) concentrates on this soft vs. hard-law distinction as a comparable and relatively easily measurable way to code the design of an international agreement. First, obligation is defined by an institution's degree of bondage and commitment. Second, there is precision, i.e., the unambiguous definition of states' required actions in an issue area. High levels of precision narrow down the "scope for reasonable interpretation" (Abbott et al. 2000, p. 402) . Finally, legalization entails delegation, which is about granting authority of implementation, interpretation, and rule application to a third party (Abbott et al. 2000, p. 401f) . In light of this overview, an agreement is seen as "hard law," if it is highly legalized through (1) clear obligations, (2) precise and unambiguously defined rules, and (3) the delegation of (some) authority to a third party. Conversely, a treaty is characterized by "soft law," if some or all of these features are missing.
The degree of legalization of an international agreement has several implications for states' freedom in decision-making and sovereignty (see Stein 2008) . In general, hard law allows for little flexibility due to its stronger commitment requirements and higher sovereignty costs: "hard law restricts actors" (Abbott and Snidal 2000, p. 422) . More demanding obligations and stronger enforcement mechanisms limit states' freedom in decision-making, and the delegation of power makes it more difficult to interpret an agreement in a selfserving manner (Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Rosendorff 2005) . Furthermore, hard law may increase the reputational costs a state will incur if it reneges on its commitments. Conversely, soft law is most often not associated with obligatory and precise commitments, but flexibility and few constraints on sovereignty and policy-making (see Downs et al. 1996; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Rosendorff 2005; Skjaerseth et al. 2006; Spilker and Koubi 2016; Böhmelt and Spilker 2016) . Countries find it arguably easier to 1 3 agree on a soft-law design, as it provides more opportunities for compromise. State leaders can then adapt an environmental agreement in light of particular needs, which allows for discretion and flexibility in implementing treaty commitments and to respond to unanticipated shocks or special domestic circumstances (Skjaerseth et al. 2006, p. 115) .
Eventually, hard law is potentially more costly and less attractive to any (potential) member, not only democracies (Downs et al. 1996; Koremenos et al. 2001; Skjaerseth et al. 2006; Stein 2008; Spilker and Koubi 2016) . 3 Martin (2000, p. 620) make the same claim when stating that "if agreements are impossible to breach, either because of their level of obligation or because the transparency of rules increases the likelihood of enforcement, elected officials may find that the costs of signing such agreements outweigh the benefits." However, ex-ante, this affects all states similarly, regardless of their form of government. Why then may particularly democratic forms of government be reluctant to select themselves into hard-law environmental agreements?
When subscribing to the claim that any political leader is primarily interested in retaining office and, hence, political survival (Mesquita et al. 2005) , policies should be made that are favorable to the relevant domestic audience, i.e., those citizens that a leader needs for gaining and staying in office. That is, leaders have to satisfy their selectorate and, more precisely, the winning coalition. The selectorate is the set of people who have the ability to choose a country's leader, while the winning coalition signifies the portion of the selectorate that keeps a leader in power (Mesquita et al. 2005) . The crucial point is that non-democratic regimes are generally characterized by smaller winning coalitions relative to the selectorate, while democratic governments have larger groups to please in order to stay in office. This is because citizens can participate more effectively in the leader-selection process: they can express their will on the performance of a government more effectively and directly in democratic states through, e.g., public referendums and elections. This implies that democratic leaders can also be removed from office more easily if the winning coalition is dissatisfied with their policies.
Against this background, we argue for a "democratic self-selection mechanism:" because of a democratic leader's primary goal of retaining office and since there are higher costs stemming from international and, primarily, domestic audiences when not complying with international commitments, democracies have an extra incentive to select themselves only into those treaties they will find easier to comply with in the first place. 4 That is, democracies are supposedly more likely and credibly to fulfill their international environmental commitments (see Martin 1993 Martin , 2000 Mansfield et al. 2002) . This also stems from the claim that they face higher audience costs if they do not keep their promises. If this applies, however, it is likely that democracies might be more careful in terms of selecting what exactly they commit to. In the words of Bättig and Bernauer (2009, p. 303) , democratic leaders "who promise more than they can implement experience political costs, for example an increasing risk of losing elections." Correspondingly, we expect democracies to participate only in those environmental treaties which they expect are easy to comply with-but these are unlikely to be hard-law agreements. In more detail, state governments and leaders, when considering tougher, i.e., hard-law standards, while anticipating that they may face problems in complying with these, are likely to face at least two risks. First, violating such a treaty involves reputational costs for a country at the international level (international audience costs), since this would signal to present as well as potential cooperation partners that a country does not necessarily adhere to its international obligations (see also Hathaway 2002) . Not complying with a treaty in one context may negatively affect cooperation prospects in other areas-not only on the environment, but also on trade, security, etc.-as the violating state is less reliable. Hence, non-compliance with an agreement makes it likely that other states will reply in a non-cooperative way as well. Any benefits from international cooperation are then at risk (see also Chiba et al. 2015, p. 970) . Due to the higher credibility of keeping international promises (Martin 1993 (Martin , 2000 Mansfield et al. 2002) , the reputational damage would be higher for democracies.
Second, treaty violation imposes domestic audience costs. People at the domestic level as well might be interested in having and keeping a positive reputation for their state in international affairs, including compliance with international environmental agreements. In case this reputation is damaged by, e.g., the violation of an international treaty, the public could be increasingly less supportive of the executive and more willing to replace a leader by a new one who has a higher credibility of keeping promises at the international level (Chiba et al. 2015, p. 971) . Recall here that it is easier and less risky to remove a leader in a democratic regime and, hence, "having sullied a state's reputation has a greater likelihood of having negative consequences for a leader's ability to stay in power in a democratic state than in a non-democratic state" (Chiba et al. 2015, p. 971) . In fact, recent research (e.g., Tomz 2008 Tomz , 2012 suggests that citizens concerned "with their state's reputation for fulfilling past commitments will be less likely to reelect a leader that violates international commitments, thus providing incentives for democratic leaders to honor their international promises" (Chiba et al. 2015, p. 968) . McGillivray and Smith (2008) show here that citizens do benefit from punishing their leader and potentially removing her from office in the event of treaty non-compliance and reputational damage caused. It follows that when anticipating these risks and being aware of international and, in particular, domestic audience costs, democratic leaders-due to their higher degree of international accountability and stronger dependency on larger parts of the population for political survival (Mesquita et al. 2005 )-should be less likely to commit to standards that make treaty compliance more challenging: that is, hard law. Ultimately, a larger share of democracies among the states participating in an international environmental agreement will be more likely to have implemented a design alternative that lowers the risk of agreement non-compliance and thus avoids audience costs: that is, soft law. 5 The empirical implication of this argument is that democracies are less likely to participate in hard-law (more binding, more constraining, and more precise) environmental agreements than soft-law treaties.
Research design

Data, methodology, and dependent variable
The empirical test of our argument is based on the quantitative cross-sectional data set by The treaty as such is the unit of analysis, which implies that the final data we employ also comprise 213 observations. Next to the "core agreements" (or framework conventions), the data include protocols, but omit amendments as these are usually only minor adjustments to treaties.
7 To the best of our knowledge, although have not updated their environmental treaty data since publication, their data are the only source with comprehensive and reliable information for our theoretical concepts of interests, i.e., most importantly treaty design features and participation statistics.
To capture how democracies are associated with the degree of legalization (e.g., Gregory and Pollack 2010; Shaffer and Pollack 2011) , we rely on the modeling approach suggested in Chiba et al. (2015) . That is, next to the same unit of analysis, i.e., the agreement as such, 8 we created a dependent variable (described below) that measures in a binary fashion whether a treaty is coded as hard or soft law. Due to the dichotomous nature of this outcome variable, we use logistic regression models and employ robust standard errors. The main explanatory variable also follows Chiba et al. (2015) in that we created an item on the proportion of democratic states that participate in a treaty by the end of 2006. We explain this variable's operationalization in detail below as well. Finally, we also take into account that states might choose to participate in an environmental agreement in the first place, i.e., before considering the design characteristics of that institution, and make use of a two-part model to this end (Chiba et al. 2015) . The results for that model are presented in the Appendix.
Coming to our dependent variable, and define legalization as a system of institutionalized rules, norms, and regulations that characterize a treaty along obligation, precision, and delegation. Spilker and Koubi (2016) argue that four variables in the data by capture these dimensions and, in turn, whether an environmental agreement can be classified as hard law or soft law. With regard to obligation, we use an item that measures whether the treaty itself establishes an enforcement mechanism (1) or not (0) and whether the agreement has any monitoring provisions (1) or not (0), respectively. The rationale for using these variables is that treaties only impose a real obligation on their members when rule compliance can be monitored and enforced. Enforcement mechanisms exist for 65 out of 213 treaties, while monitoring devices are given for 66 agreements. The Kyoto Protocol's Subsidiary Body for Implementation, for example, monitors and enforces its goals. Second, in terms of precision, we consider a dichotomous variable receiving the value of 1 if a treaty specifies quantitative targets or clear provisions. Ambiguous or no specifications at all of what has to be achieved are coded as 0. For instance, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer specifies that "from 1991 to 1992 its [chlorofluorocarbon] levels of consumption and production of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A do not exceed 150% of its calculated levels of production and consumption of those substances in 1986." It is, therefore, a very precise agreement. In our sample, 160 out of 213 treaties are characterized as "precise." Finally, delegation is captured by whether a treaty provides a third-party dispute settlement body. There are many different types of dispute settlement mechanisms: some agreements appoint external bodies, resolve issues through the International Court of Justice, or have internal negotiation procedures in place. Our variable receives a value of 1 if an agreement provides guidelines on how disputes should be dealt with (0 otherwise). A total of 120 treaties have such provisions.
Based on these four variables, we created the aggregated index Hard Law that receives a value of 1 if any three of the four items or all four variables are coded as 1 (0 otherwise). In our sample, 104 out of 213 treaties (48.83%) are hard-law agreements. Table 1 illustrates the coding of our dependent variable via some prominent treaties in the data set (see also Spilker and Koubi 2016, p. 231) .
Proportion of democracies and control covariates
Our main explanatory variable pertains to the share of democratic states that have participated in a particular environmental agreement by 2006, i.e., have ratified it (and this Grigorescu 2007 Grigorescu , 2010 . The data from Cheibub et al. (2010) 9 classify a regime as a democracy if all of the following criteria are met: (1) the chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected; (2) the legislature must be popularly elected; (3) there must be more than one party competing in the elections; and (4) an alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place (Cheibub et al. 2010, p. 69 We also control for a broad set of alternative determinants of the design of environmental treaties as well as states' decision to participate in such agreements. These controls are primarily based on and Spilker and Koubi (2016) , but also derived from earlier studies analyzing states' commitments to international environmental problem-solving efforts (e.g., Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Neumayer 2002a, b; Murdoch et al. 2003; Beron et al. 2003; Roberts et al. 2004; Fredriksson et al. 2007; Stein 2008; Bernauer et al. 2010; Perrin and Bernauer 2010; Mansfield et al. 2002; Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Lantis 2009; Lupu 2014; Pollack 2015) . First, different treaties became open to ratification at different points in time and, thus, vary in the time elapsed in which joining an agreement was possible. Controlling for the age of a treaty seems also crucial when assuming that states' willingness or capacity to implement hardlaw designs may have changed over time. Therefore, we control for the age of an environmental agreement, which is operationalized as the time elapsed since a treaty was open for ratification until 2006. We additionally include the squared term of Treaty Age to allow for a curvilinear impact on the likelihood of hard-law design.
Second, we control for the total number of countries that participate in an environmental agreement. This item is based on the data from who have coded the number of states that joined a treaty by the end of 2006. States' participation decisions might be influenced by other countries' choices (e.g., Bernauer et al. 2010; Perrin and Bernauer 2010) . Due to diffusion mechanisms, a state might find continued participation more attractive if a large number of other states do so (see, e.g., Gilardi 2010 Gilardi , 2012 .
Finally, we include binary variables that control for specific issue areas. An institution's underlying problem structure influences its design and participation patterns (e.g., Koremenos et al. 2001; Mitchell 2006; Miles et al. 2001; Böhmelt and Pilster 2010) . To this end, we include dummy variables that indicate whether a treaty addresses (1) matters of environmental pollution, (2) the protection of endangered species, microorganisms, and wildlife, (3) nuclear energy issues within the environmental sphere, and (4) particular ecosystems such as desertification, barren land, or wetlands. We use these variables as proxies for the different problem structures environmental treaties may have, since Miles et al. (2001) show that an institution's underlying problem structure does indeed vary over issue areas. In turn, participation and design might be influenced by these. For example, nuclear energy issues have been a particularly salient topic especially during the early decades of our observation period. It may then be less likely that agreements dealing with this issue area are characterized by hard law as it constrains countries' decision-making power and sovereignty more than soft law. Table 2 summarizes the main models of our empirical analysis. The first model focuses on Proportion of Democracies as the only explanatory variable. Clarke (2005 Clarke ( , 2009 , for example, argues that control variables may increase the bias in model estimates, and not decrease it, under specific circumstances. Model 2 then drops the main independent variable and incorporates the control covariates only. Finally, Model 3 constitutes our core model as both the main explanatory item and the controls are jointly considered. For assessing the models' fit, we report logarithmic (pseudo) likelihoods, 2 test statistics, and the area under the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve. The latter is based on an in-sample prediction approach and theoretically varies between 0.5 (no predictive power) and 1.0 (perfect predictive power). Since coefficients in nonlinear models such as the logistic regression we use cannot be directly interpreted in terms of their substance, we report first difference estimates in Table 3 (for the control variables) and predicted probabilities of hard law in Fig. 1 (for Proportion of Democracies). To assess the robustness of our results, we examined various alternative model specifications, which are summarized in the Appendix. The findings from these robustness checks further support the results discussed in the following. First, the models in Table 2 provide strong support for our theory. Regardless of the model specification, Proportion of Democracies exerts a negative and highly significant impact on the likelihood of hard law. Our main explanatory variable also contributes to the model fit as demonstrated by the difference in the area-under-curve statistics. For example, this statistic increases by 0.045 units when changing from Model 2 to Model 3. In more substantive terms, Fig. 1 shows the predicted probabilities for Hard Law = 1 under two different scenarios: first, when Proportion of Democracies receives the value of 1, i.e., an environmental treaty comprises only democracies; and, secondly, when Proportion of Democracies = 0, i.e., when there are no democratic members at all in an institution. We calculated these substantive quantities of interest while holding all other variables constant at their median values along the lines of King et al. (2000) . As the probabilities are therefore simulated parameters, we present density plots that capture their distribution, and the horizontal bars at the bottom of Fig. 1 signify the point estimates of the two scenarios' probabilities and their 90% confidence intervals. When all states that have participated in an international environmental agreement by the end of 2006 were democratic, the predicted probability for this treaty being of a hard-law nature is around 25%. Conversely, this probability increases by about 39 percentage points to 64% when there was not a single democracy among the members of an environmental agreement in 2006, i.e., when changing Proportion of Democracies to 0. Note that the horizontal bars for the probabilities' point estimates and confidence intervals do not overlap, which means that the difference between the two scenarios' predicted probabilities is statistically significant.
Ultimately, we conclude that our empirics strongly and robustly suggest that democratic leaders may expect to experience higher costs, internationally and even more so at the domestic level, for violating environmental agreements than non-democratic regimes. Hence, they are more inclined to participate in international commitments that can be complied with more easily-and, thus, they only implement or participate in treaty designs that are less binding, less precise, and more flexible, i.e., all sorts of characteristics that are not compatible with hard law. And this induces that the proportion of democratic members in an environmental agreement is negatively associated with hard-law treaty designs due to the self-selection mechanism we outlined in the theory section above.
Coming to our control variables, Table 2 demonstrates that Pollution and Habitat achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. All else equal, particularly treaties dealing with these kinds of underlying problems are more likely to be characterized by 3) . However, the negative impact of Proportion of Democracies on Hard Law prevails even with an interactive specification. Finally, the results for the treaty age items are discussed in the Appendix.
Conclusion
The empirical findings confirm our theoretical expectation that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law due to a self-selection process into participation. Our argument explicitly sought to link agreements' degrees of legalization with regime type and to examine variation in treaties' design (e.g., Gregory and Pollack 2010; Shaffer and Pollack 2011) . Eventually, our theory focused on international and, particularly, domestic audience costs, which are likely to be higher in democratic states when violating international agreements. Democratic leaders are likely to anticipate this and will participate only in those treaty designs that allow for more flexibility, which constrain less in terms of sovereignty, and that impose fewer costs in case of non-compliance: these are soft-law agreements.
The empirical analysis was built on data by that provide information on 213 global environmental treaties since 1950. While controlling for several alternative determinants of hard-law design and treaty participation (ratification), the main analyses and the additional checks in the Appendix provide robust support for a negative impact of Proportion of Democracies on Hard Law. Several important implications follow from our work both for the academic literature and policymakers. First, our statistical models address associations between variables, not causation. We also studied the macro-level or net implications of a phenomenon in the context of environmental politics and, particularly, democracies' ratification of international agreements. To this end, we concentrated on a macro-level theoretical framework that attempts to explain events essentially consisting of a series of individual decisions. The empirical findings are, in principle, consistent with our arguments, but it may also be the case that factors like more neoliberal types of governance or voluntarism play important roles. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to successfully link macro-level theories to individual-level assessments of motives and preferences, a more detailed empirical analysis at the micro, i.e., individual, level seeking to address more thoroughly the underlying causal mechanisms could further improve our knowledge of democracies' attitudes toward hard and soft law, and how this relationship affects treaty participation.
Second, our work focuses on international environmental agreements, but the findings could possibly be extended to other issue areas. Chiba et al. (2015) , for instance, show that similar patterns are at work for military alliances. That said, additional empirical analyses in the context of trade or human-rights treaties might be an effort worth making, as the dynamics, interests, and decision-making processes there might fundamentally differ from the environmental area we have focused on (see, e.g., Hathaway 2002) . Moreover, our analysis is based on treaties for the time period from 1950 to 2000, while members' participation in these agreements has been coded until 2006. While it is unlikely that our results would change when taking more recent data into account, updating the data set from Bernauer et al. (2013) seems necessary.
Third, our research demonstrates that the statement by Neumayer (2002a, p. 139) holds, but only under certain conditions: "the spread of democracy around the world will lead to enhanced environmental commitment worldwide." Soft law is positively associated with democratic forms of government, but hard law is not. In light of this finding and when subscribing to the claim that hard law is generally more conducive to effectively addressing environmental problems, our work contributes to explaining why we sometimes observe a significant "words-deeds" gap in environmental policy-making (Bättig and Bernauer 2009) . That is, democracies are more likely to avoid hard-law commitments and pursue soft law instead, although the latter is usually more likely to be less suitable for addressing environmental problems effectively (see Downs et al. 1996; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Rosendorff 2005; Skjaerseth et al. 2006; Spilker and Koubi 2016) . In the words of Chiba et al. (2015, p. 979), "[w] hat is an advantage for democratic states in making their commitments credible (and thus attracting partners to their cooperative endeavors) may simultaneously make democratic leaders reluctant to join international commitments that require particularly broad or deep cooperation." In addition, non-democratic regimes might select themselves more often into hard law, but they lack either willingness or capacity to uphold their claims. Ultimately, democracies tend to make promises that are shallow to begin with, while non-democracies cannot or will not ensure compliance; this induces a net discrepancy between what countries promise internationally and what is being delivered. Derived from this, our work potentially contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of environmental agreements. As Miles et al. (2001) show, there is a strong link between the design of an institution and its effectiveness. An implication of our work is that democracies tend to "soften-up" environmental agreements, which in turn may eventually lower an institution's performance.
More generally, we thus add to the debate on "constraining and screening effects" of international institutions (Stein 2008) : while democracies may be more credible and reliable in terms of upholding their commitments, they carefully screen agreements first and systematically seek to avoid treaties that may seem overly constraining. Separating these effects may be even more difficult, since screening is endogenous to constraint (see also Chiba et al. 2015 ), but our research provides an explanation for why so many democratic states are not associated with environmental improvement at the outcome level (Ward 2008) 12 -as they avoid hard-law treaties and soft-law agreements may be less adequate for having a significant impact on environmental quality as such. That being said, our research also implies that if a democratic leader actually does select her country into a hard-law agreement, she must be relatively certain about the compliance with that agreement (see also Chiba et al. 2015, p. 979) .
Finally, for effectively increasing the attractiveness of more legalized international environmental agreements-even in the eyes of democratic leaders-and, potentially, to improve their effectiveness, theoretical and empirical work should seek to study more thoroughly, which design features are seen as most desirable and implementable. To this end, we would obtain a better understanding of the conditions under which democratic states do participate in hard-law treaties and, as a result, also the conditions under which audience costs deter democracies from entering arrangements. Ultimately, one might want to design treaty features that more positively affect states' incentive structures and, therefore, contribute to agreement participation in and eventually the effectiveness of an institution. Such an analysis could also focus directly on international bargaining processes and their timing with respect to relevant domestic policy-making processes.
We conclude this article by highlighting that the proportion of democratic states participating in an international environmental agreement is negatively associated with hardlaw treaty designs. The effect is both significant and substantial. Further research should take this finding into account for analyzing screening and selection effects in the context of international institutions more directly and jointly, and when exploring design features that may eventually cancel out the negative impact on hard law that we identified.
